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FORFEITURE OF REINSTATEMENT RIGHTS BY
MISCONDUCT UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY
LINDSAY P. WALDEN
of the Denver Bar, General Counsel for Oil Workers International Union, CIO

This discussion is prepared with primary emphasis upon what
happens at operating level with respect to the question of forfeiting rights to reinstatement because of misconduct on the picket
line and what constitutes misconduct. The attitude of the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, when complaints
are sought in discharge cases and the judgment of the Labor Board
when such complaints come up for hearing have become of great
practical importance. From the operating level point of view, the
Board's decisional policies are secondary if the views of the Board's
General Counsel are contrary to those of the Board, because under
the Taft-Hartley Act 1 the General Counsel has final authority to
determine which complaints shall be heard by the Board by merely
refusing to issue the complaint. Under the Wagner Act this conflict did not exist, as the charging party had the right to appeal
to the Board itself should the Board's attorney refuse to issue the
complaint.
The question of forfeiting rights to reinstatement because of
misconduct on the picket line arises, under the present status of
the law, because of the proviso in Section 10 (c) of the Act, which
reads as follows:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any
individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged
for cause. (Italics added).

This section 10(c) proviso was not in the Wagner Act, but
the Board and the courts in administering that Act did deny relief
to strikers and pickets who were found guilty of misconduct under
certain circumstances. However, those decisions are not here emphasized as this discussion is directed toward present status of the
law governing picketing. Actually, the misconduct here discussed
is not limited to picketing, as all misconduct activities in connection with a strike fall within the same legal principles whether it
be related to picketing or other associated strike activities.
Section 7 of the Act gives the employees the right to engage
in picketing activities, and Sections (8)a (1) and 8(a) (3) of the
Act attempt to protect the employees in the exercise of picketing
activities, but the protection is forfeited by the proviso of Section
10(c) if the employee is suspended or discharged for cause. The
problem then arises as to what misconduct on the part of the em'Labor-Management

Relations Act, 1947, Act of June 2.3, 1947, c. 120. 61 Stat. 136.
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ployee forfeits this protection for cause if the employer elects to
suspend or discharge the employee.
In the Standard Oil Company of California case,2 decided
October 13, 1950, the Board held, as a matter of law, that if, in
fact, the employees were not guilty of the forbidden picketing conduct then the employer has no valid defense for refusing to reinstate them to their former jobs, even though the employer in good
faith believed they were guilty of misconduct. This same rule of
law was announced by the Board in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.
case3 which grew out of the alleged seizure via a sit-down strike of
the company's refinery by the strikers. This doctrine was also
applied by the Board in the Perfect Circle case 4 to a situation in
which the employer urged that its plant manager reasonably believed that striking employees as pickets barred his entry to the
plant under threat of violence. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in NLRB v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.5 sustained the Board in holding, upon conflicting evidence, that three
strikers, whom the employer believed engaged in misconduct, did
not, as a matter of fact, engage in such conduct, and, consequently,
that the employer did not have good cause for discharging the
strikers.
SUMMARY OF PRESENT STATUS OF LAW

Possibly, the best summary of the present status of the law
on this subject is stated by the Board in theStandard Oil of California case 6 , wherein it held:
The function of determining whether the striker's conduct is
lawful or unlawful has been entrusted by the Congress to the Board,
subject to judicial review, and not to any private agency. Thus an
employer, who discharges a striker on the ground that he has engaged
in unlaw strike activities, does so at the peril of deciding wrongly.
(Italics added).

In the above case, the employer filed a motion asking the
Board to take judicial notice of certain proceedings on the ground
that a California state court had found 24 of the discharged employees guilty of violating an injunction restraining mass picketing and acts of violence in connection with the strike. With respect to this motion, the Board stated:
This Board is not bound by determinations of a State Court in a
proceeding to which the Board is not a party; and, so far as appears,
the California Court did not make specific findings of fact as to the
alleged misconduct of the strikers. Under these circumstances, we
must rest our findings upon the evidence in the record before us.

In the same case, the Board further held that, "misconduct
2 91 N.L.R.B. 87 (1950).
354 N.L.R.B. 912 (1944).
470 N.L.R.B. 526 (1946) ; reversed on other grounds in 162 F. 2d 566
5145 F. 2d 66 (1944).
GNote 2, supra.

(1947).
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is an affirmative defense" and that the burden of proof is upon
the employer who alleges that the discharge was made because of
the striker's alleged misconduct, and that the discharge of strikers
or pickets, "may be viewed . .. as having been made because of
lawful strike activity, unless the employer affirmatively proves
employee misconduct."
The academic law, at the present, concerning the effect which
unlaWful picketing or strike activities have upon rights of employees under the Taft-Hartley Act appears to be: First, Strikers
and pickets are presumed to have engaged in lawful and protected
conduct and are entitled to reinstatement upon abandonment of
the strike. Second, The burden of proof is upon the employer to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that each discharged
or disciplined employee engaged in unprotected misconduct. Third,
The National Labor Relations Board, subject to judicial review, is
the sole judge as to whether strikes or pickets engaged in unlawful
conduct and as to what activities constitute misconduct.
In determining misconduct, the Board will not accept the employer's conclusion, which was based upon hearsay or rumor, consisting of written and unwritten statements received by the employer from non-strikers and supervisors who
failed to testifJ
7
directly in the proceedings before the Board.
Undoubtedly, there are many more activities and circumstances constituting misconduct which lawfully justfy loss of employee status than have been determined to date. Space will not
permit a complete discussion of all prior decisions on this subject.
ACTIVITIES CONSTITUTING MISCONDUCT

Some of the activties found by either the Board or the courts
to constitute misconduct are: physically blocking the entrance and
preventing operation of a mine ;" striking employees physically attacking another employee who had returned to work while strike
continued;9 employees striking to compel an employer to violate a
law (Federal Stabilization Act of 1942) ;1o participating in strike
in violation of no-strike clause of valid contract ;11 pickets preventing plant manager from entering property by use of words and acts
which justified manager in believing that he could not get possession except through a fight and bloodshed;12 participating in a
strike to require an employer to recognize one union when another
union has been certified by the board ;13 picket threatening other
employees with physical violence and participating in mass picketing of plant entrance, spitting on the general manager, and openly
advocating use of force and violence as an instrument of collective
?Ohio Associated Telephone Company, 91 N.L.R.B. 162 (1950).
'N.L.R.B. v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 145 F. 2d 66 (1944).
-Decatur Newspapers, Inc., 16 N.L.R.B. 489 (1939).
American News Co., Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
Copperxweld Steel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 18 (1947).
-N.L.R.B. v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 556 (1947).
'Thompson Products, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947).
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bargaining and as a strike weapon. 14 In the latter case, the Board
stated that the picketing by from 75 to 100 strikers at the plant
entrance "had the effect of barring supervisory and other employees from the plant," and .that the picket whose reinstatement
was in question "personally participated in such mass picketing."
Similarly, in the Roanoke Public Warehouse case, 15 an employeepicket was barred from reinstatement after wielding a heavy belt
on the picket line which resulted in his conviction of six separate
charges of assault, three of which were against fellow non-striking employees.
MASS DEMONSTRATIONS HELD MISCONDUCT

Participating in the seizure and retention of the employer's
plant by means of a sit-down strike is misconduct under the Fansteel decision of the Supreme Court, 16 and this is true despite the
union's contention that employees seized control in order to shut7
down dangerous operations safely when the strike was called.'
Likewise, participating during a strike in a mass demonstration
which amounted to a forcible debarment of persons lawfully entitled to enter a plant has been held to be misconduct forfeiting
reinstatement rights.18 However, in the Standard Oil Co. of California case,' 9 the Board denied the company's contention that it
had "a right to discharge all those identified in the mob" which
gathered at the entrance because, in the language of the Board:
Unlike the situation in Socony Vacutm the strikers here did not
gather at the gates pursuant to any plan to obstruct entry to or from
the refinery, or any other illegal plan; and the record dicloses . . .
that many of these strikers . . . were merely observers who stood
apart from those who gathered directly in front of the Respondent's
gates.

With reference to pickets' hurling of obnoxious and offensive
epithets at non-strikers, such as "scabs" and "suckers", the Board
in the Wytheville Knitting Mills case 20 said:
Although we have not previously condoned the use of abusive
and intemperate language in the conduct of industrial relations, reality requires us to recognize that industrial disputes are not always

conducted in the dispassionate atmosphere best calculated to result
in their amicable settlement. Viewed in this light, the language of
(the pickets) . . . must be regarded as an integral and inseparable
part

of their

concerted activity

for

which

the

Act affords

them

protection.

Apparently the Third Circuit Court of Appeals does not agree
with the Board as the case was reversed. The Court of Appeals
stated:
" Dearborn Glass Co.. 78 N.L.R.B. 891 (1948).
072 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1947).
N.L.R.B. N'.Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
1Mid-Continent
Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912 (1944)
"Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1948).
'991 N.L.R.B. 87 (1950).
2"N.L.R.B. v. \vythe\ille Knitting Arills, 175 F. 2d 238 (1949).
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We do not regard the conduct

. . . as a legitimate, concerted

activity entitled to the protection of the Act. When as a result of it,
each of them became persona non grata to their fellow workers to
such an extent that the latter absolutely declined to work with them
.. . the respondent was not required ... to reinstate them at the risk
of throwing the scaming department into confusion. (Italics added).

It is not clear whether the use of the words "scab" and "suckers" standing alone would justify the discharges if fellow employees did not refuse to work with the pickets who used the words.
However, on October 12, 1950, a trial examiner in Tidewater
Associated Oil Company' held that a statement by a picket "that
anyone that went through a picket line was a dirty rotten scab"
merely followed a custom that has existed for many years in labor
disputes, and recommended that the discharged employee be reinstated. Therefore, it appears somewhat doubtful whether pickets
may use the word "scab" toward non-strikers and still receive protection of the Act. The answer to this question must necessarily
depend upon subsequent decisions.
Five employees who engaged in a concerted slow-down following a wage reduction were held guilty of misconduct sufficient to
warrant their discharge in the Elk Lumber Co. case.2 2 Cutting off
the power from the boiler stoker preparatory to going on strike
was deemed misconduct in the River Falls Co-operative Creamery
case,- 3 especially since this was neither the normal act of a fireman
about to leave his post nor a necessary concomitant of his going
on strike.
UNION OFFICER HELD RESPONSIBLE

In another Tidewater Associated Oil Co. case, 24 the trial examiner held that a union officer who was present and witnessed
the assault and manhandling of non-strikers "without making an
effort to halt the attack" was guilty of misconduct. It is interesting
to note here, however, with respect to another discharge, that the
trial examiner held:
Assuming, arguendo, that Fonseca had in fact thrown the pebbles

or gravel or small rocks testified to by McLaughlin and Jessee as
having occurred on September 29, such conduct could not warrant his

exclusion from an order of reinstatement.

In support of the above finding, the trial examiner cited NLRB v.
Elkland Leather Co.2 5 wherein the U. S. Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, had sustained the Board in its findings that the offenses
charged were not "of sufficient gravity to warrant exclusion from
the order of reinstatement." Certiorari was denied by the U. S.
Supreme Court. With respect to the trial examiner's ruling, it is
well to point out that the circuit court decision relied upon arose
N.L.R.B. Case No. 20-CA-170

(19,H).

-91 N.L.R.B. 60 (1950).
2 90 N.L.R.B. 56 (1950).
- N.L.R.B. Case No. 21-CA-170 (1950).
114 F. 2d 221 (CA 3) (1940).
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under the Wagner Act rather than under the Taft-Hartley Act,
and consequently, may not be conclusive.
The oft-cited Standard Oil Co. of California case26 is quite
inclusive as to the subject of misconduct and appears to be the latest decision by the NLRB on the subject. Fifty-six employees were
discharged for alleged misconduct, and the Board ordered fortythree of them reinstated. The Board found the evidence insufficient
to establish that the latter had committed the alleged acts of misconduct. The specific acts of misconduct which the Board found
as good cause for refusal to reinstate the thirteen pickets who were
denied protection under the act were: (a) Picking up a rock for
the sole purpose of throwing it at the police officers who were
escorting a non-striker in a squad car and for refusal to put down
the rock when ordered to do so by the police. (b) Smashing the
windows of cars which were entering the refinery gate. (c) Carrying stones, together with other pickets, which prevented two nonstrikers from entering a parking lot prior to going to work.
(d) Struggling with police officers and interfering with police officers in their efforts to perform their duties. (e) Standing in front
of cars at the entrance to the parking lot and refusing to move
at the command of police, and pushing back the police officers
who were trying to remove him from in front of the cars. (f)
Beating up four non-strikers when attempting to enter the refinery premises. Grabbing a non-striker by the arm and pulling him off company property when walking to work. (g)
Striking an employee of a construction contractor when going
to work at the same refinery to perform work for his construction
employer. (h) Stating to a female employee who was attempting
to cross the picket line, "You dirty little bitch, you are not going to
work."
APPLICATION OF LEGAL DEFINITION DIFFICULT

The Board also held that the employer may not refuse reinstatement to a picket on the ground that the picket prevented the
passage of a railroad train to and from the refinery where the
picket's activity was that of walking back and forth across the
tracks rather than parallel to the tracks when the locomotive approached the picket line. It was held that the picket did not thus
physically block ingress or egress to the plant, and also that this
picket's statement that "he would lie down on the tracks rather
than permit passage of the train" was not sufficient attempt to
block the entry to the refinery and did not bar his reinstatement.
With respect to another picket, the Board held that his alleged misconduct did not justify his discharge because rocks were thrown
at him by employees inside the plant, and this picket threw two
- 91 N.L.R.B. 87

(1950).
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stones back, "each a little bigger than the size of a penny" and the
small stones fell harmlessly. The Board further stated:
In our opinion, Ottino's conduct, under the circumstances hereinabove set forth ... was not of such a serious nature as to pass the
limits of protected activity.

As can be seen by the cited authorities, the question of what
constitutes misconduct is somewhat vague and is still in the stage
of development. However, as a general guide, it is suggested that
the definition cited by the trial examiner in the Tidewater Associated Oil Company case, citing Boynton Cab Co. vs. Neubeck, by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 27 may be used. This reads as
follows:
* * * The term "Misconduct" used in (the disqualification provision)
is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of
his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil
design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the
employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to his
employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as a result of inability or incapacity,
inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances or good
faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.

PICKETING-

FREE SPEECH?

CHARLES A. GRAHAM
of the Denver Bar

The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Thornhill v. Alabama1 has given
2 rise to extensive speculation as
to the legal status of picketing.
Language employed by the court has been quoted to support
the contention that picketing is a form of speech on a parity with
public debate for purposes of determining its constitutional immunity to regulation.3 The consequences, of course, would be that
picketing could be neither forbidden nor punished unless upon a
showing of a clear and present danger of extremely serious4 sub27296 N. W. 636 (1941).
310 U.S. 88 (1949).
'Adequate citation to the legal journals alone would require more than the space
allocated for this discussion. A few references will be provided below.
3 One of the most specific statements of this sort, made by the late Mr. Justice
Murphy, was: "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." (Supra, n. 1 at 102).
4 "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 263 (1941).

